Or lack thereof, according to Walter Russel Mead. Found here.
Personally, I don't see how the claim that the US is not in decline follows logically from the observation of changes in Australian policy, Japanese policy, and Burmese policy. What is the logic behind assuming that the US would be less likely to push for all the changes highlighted by Mead if the US was not in relative decline? Is it not at least plausible that states try harder to assemble counter-balancing coalitions in the face of a rising threat?
I don't know the answer to that question. Sadly, what little analysis of these types of questions the field ever managed to produce was pretty underwhelming. (Though, thankfully, we've got some smart folks working on the topic of coalition formation now -- and maybe Scott will even be kind enough to weigh in here.) But I think it is at least plausible that the actions Mead highlights are in fact a sign that the US is in decline.
That said, I'll reiterate what I've said in the past (see here and here, for example): the US may well be in relative decline, but that doesn't mean that those who are claiming that the US is already irrelevant or soon will be have effectively made their case. The US came out of the Cold War in a very dominant position. A non-trivial erosion of influence would still leave the US comfortably at the top. I think it is entirely reasonable to say that, in some aspects (particularly in the security realm), the US has seen some erosion of influence. But there's still a long way to go before we can say the US isn't on top.
This shouldn't be so complicated. If a state is currently stronger than all other states, but growing less rapidly than the second, third, and fourth most powerful states, how might we describe the position of that state? Dominant, but in relative decline, yes? Could someone please explain to me how we know that the United States does not fit that description fairly well?
Pressure Not War
5 days ago
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